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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND S. KING, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
HOWARD FIRM and PAUL J. COX, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No~ 
8201 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondents will be referred to herein as defendants, 
and Appellant will be referred to as plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover the sum of 
$31,920.40, his costs, and such other and further relief 
as to the court may seem just and equitable in the premises 
for the alleged wrongful and unlawful dispossession or 
ouster of the plain tiff from certain premises leased by 
defendants to plaintiff, under the terms and conditions of 
a written instrument designated "Lease" and identified 
as Exhibit ''A.'' 
The premises involved are described in the lease as 
follows: 
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Description of Property 
A part of Lot 16 of 0. D. Gifford's survey of 
the East half of the Northwest quarter and the 
North half of the Southwest quarter of Section 28 
Township 41 South Range 10 West Salt Lake 
Meridian, located on property of the Lessors on 
the West side of the Utah State Highway #15 
and consisting of the refreshment building 20 ft. x 
20 ft. in size and opposite the Zionville Cafe and 
Motel with 100 feet of ground fronting on said 
road and extending back of West side about 50 feet 
to a semicircular terrace; the said premises being 
located about one ... third mile from the South en ... 
trance to Zion National Park. 
The term of the lease was from May 1st, 1951 to 
May 1st, 1957. 
The purpose of the lease as ·set forth therein was 
to permit the plaintiff "to conduct a refreshment business 
furnishing sandwiches, hot dogs, soft drinks, beer, candy, 
cigarettes and novel ties.'' 
Without objection from the defendants, plaintiff 
testified that the operation of a soft ice cream machine 
was contemplated by the parties (Rec. 110 ... 112). See 
Defendants' testimony on this point (Rec. 161 ... 162). Even 
this evidence does not support any specific agreement be ... 
tween the parties that the defendants were to supply ade ... 
quate water for the operation of a soft ice cream machine. 
The water supply was sufficient to operate a refreshment 
business such as delineated in the lease agreement. 
As shown by the record much of plaintiff's claim 
for damages evolves about his contention that the failure 
of the defendants to furnish adequate water supply for 
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his soft ice cream machine caused great loss of business 
(Record 93 ... 1 01), yet he admitted on cross examination 
that his experience with the operation of the soft ice 
cream machine at the cafe before the construction of the 
so ... called Frosty Freeze Building proved definitely there was 
not sufficient water supply in the whole Spring Dale area 
to keep even one unit of such equipment in constant opera ... 
tion and at full capacity (Record 109 ... 114). Defendants 
attempted to supply an auxiliary source of water through 
a well but this had to be abandoned when the water level 
in the river became too low. Plaintiff then installed an 
air cooler for the remainder of the 19 52 season. 
While plaintiff claimed damage through the loss of 
business allegedly attributed to failure of the defendants 
to have the building completed yet on the trial of the 
case he admitted that loss of business through this con ... 
clition \Vas practically nill ( Record 121). 
\Xlith respect to the modification of the lease to pro ... 
vide for the first year of operation rental at 5% of the 
net instead of 5 7o of the gross take the facts are Defendant 
Firm at all times relied on the terms of the lease for the 
meaning of the expression "first year" (Rec. 163 ... 164). 
The Lease "Exhibit 5" 5th paragraph reads: 
"The said lessee covenants and agrees to pay 
to said lessor as rental for said premises· at the rate 
of $50.00 per month during the summer months 
of May to October of each year, payable monthly 
in advance but such period to be limited to the 
months in which profitable business can be con ... 
ducted also to be extended to other months in 
case profitable business can be conducted or in 
lieu of said above rental, the lessee may pay to 
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the lessors 5 % of the gross sales of said business 
and he shall keep a strict account thereof and 
make payment on the first day of each month 
during the periods as above stated." 
That the expression "first year of operation" as used 
by the parties in their modification agreement could mean 
only the seasonal operation in the year 1951 finds ample 
support in plaintiff's statement of facts (Page 4 of brief, 
1st paragraph). 
No accounting of sales or profits was made by plaintiff 
and no tender of any rent whatsoever until almost a month 
after defendants served plaintiff with written notice of 
termination of the lease Ex. 7. This notice was served 
on July 26th, 1952, and on August 29th, 1952, plaintiff 
presented an accounting to the defendants Plaintiff's Ex ... 
hibit "8," and tendered a check in the sum of $100.00. 
Firm refused to accept the accounting or the check and on 
August 23rd, 1953, placed a padlock on the door of the 
Frosty Freeze Building. 
No demand was ever made by plaintiff for surrender 
of possession of the premises or of the contents. About all 
that happened in that regard is reflected in the cross ex--
amination of Mrs. Hirschi, plaintiff's witness when she and 
plaintiff went to Mr. Firm and asked to be let in the build--
ing to see some papers and some of his supplies (Record 
17 .... 18). 
In a transaction between plaintiff and the defendants 
entirely independent of the lease involved in this action, 
plaintiff loaned money t9 the defendants, and took as 
security a mortgage on properties other than the Frosty 
Freeze Building. This mortgage was dated September 1, 
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1951, and called for $1800.00 principal. In the spring 
of March 1, 1952, nothing had been paid on this mort, 
gage and the parties then agreed upon a new note and 
mortgage for $2146.00. The difference of $346.00 repre--
sented the cost of some equipment installed by plain--
tiff and was intended to secure a promissory note of 
even date in the amount of $2146.00. Between the time 
of the execution of the original $1800.00 mortgage and 
the spring of 1952 defendant Firm became married. The 
new papers were drafted to include the signature of Firm's 
wife. Plaintiff's coun·sel advised her signature was not 
necessary because the original transaction took place before 
Firm's marriage, but said in substance it would do no harm 
to have Mrs. Firm sign the note and mortgage and it might 
help (Record 128). Mrs. Firm refused to sign, but Mr. 
and Mrs. Paul J. Cox and Mr. Howard Firm, all parties 
to the original deal, signed and plaintiff took possession 
of the documents and retained same to the day of the 
trial, and at that time made no attempt to deliver same 
to the defendants or either of them or to declare they were 
of no value or use to him. On the contrary plaintiff testi--
fied he was still holding the chattel mortgage for $2146.00 
to secure the payment of the $346.00 (Rec. 133). 
The court found the new note and mortgage for 
$2146.00 were valid and subsisting obligations of the de--
fendants, except for the payments made thereon and that 
defendants still owed plaintiff $346.00 thereon, but not 
due and payable until March of 1954. Plaintiff contends 
payment of $1967.50 was credited on the old mortgage 
and that the $346.00 embraced in the new documents, 
making a principal obligation of $2146.00 instead of 
$1800.00 then became an open account, although he still 
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held the note and mortgage for $2146.00 as security for 
the 346.00 (Rec. 133). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANTS RIGHTFULLY TERMINATED 
PLAINTIFF'S LEASE AND TOOK POSSESSION OF 
THE PREMISES FOR PLAINTIFF'S F AlLURE TO 
RENDER THE ACCOUNTINGS AND PAY THE 
RENTALS PROVIDED BY THE LEASE AGREE .. 
MENT. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANTS RIGHTFULLY TERMIN .. 
A TED PLAINTIFF'S LEASE AND TOOK POSSES .. 
SION OF THE PREMISES FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
FAILURE TO RENDER THE ACCOUNTINGS AND 
PAY THE RENTALS PROVIDED BY THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT. 
At the outset it is clear from plaintiff's pleadings, 
his position taken at the pre .. trial, his statement to the 
Trial Judge at the commencement of the trial (pages One 
and Two of the Record), his conduct throughout the 
trial, and his position taken in his brief before this Hon .. 
arable Court, that the action is brought under the Forcible 
Entry and Unlawful Detainer Statute, although no founda .. 
tion was laid for such action and no deman·d for restitu .. 
tion of the premises was made in the pleadings or sought 
at the trial. The Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer 
Statute of Utah is essentially and primarily a remedy pro .. 
vided for restitution of premises forcibly entered and/or 
forcibly or unlawfully detained. Forcible entry and de .. 
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tainer as a civil proceeding is based on, and has by modern 
legislation been evolved from the English forcible entry 
and detainer which was a criminal proceeding merely. 
The remedy is purely statutory and is summary in char~ 
acter. The action is strictly possessory in its nature, so 
that ordinarily the immediate right to be reinstated in 
possession of the realty is all that is involved and can be 
determined. It is a remedy for the protection of possession 
of realty, whether rightful or wrongful, against forcible in~ 
vasion, its objects being to prevent disturbances of the 
public peace, and to forbid any person righting himself by 
his own hand and by violence. 
The Utah statute clearly authorizes recovery of dam~ 
ages in a forcible entry and detainer action. The damages 
must be such as are the natural and proximate con~ 
sequences of the acts complained of. The remedy for dam~ 
ages is purely incidental . to the primary or summary 
remedy provided for restitution of the realty, and the 
statute makes no provision for recovery of damages by 
separate action for trespass, as is provided under the 
statutes of some of our states, such as Michigan (Lane 
vs. Ruhl, 61 N.W. 347, 103 Mich. 38). 
Under these circumstances the Trial Judge, Hon. Will 
J. Hoyt, took the position, and tried the case, upon the 
theory that plaintiff's suit was not, and could not be, pre~ 
dicated or bottomed on the forcible entry and detainer 
statute under the pleadings presented, but rather was an 
action for damages for alleged breach of defendants' agree~ 
ment to construct a refreshment building and furnish 
adequate water supply to operate the business contem~ 
plated by plaintiff's lease. 
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Defendants alleged and proved substantial perform~ 
ance of their covenants under the lease; alleged and proved 
failure of the plaintiff to render accounting of his conduct 
of the business and payment of the rentals provided by 
the lease agreement. 
We therefore take the position before this honorable 
court that the trial judge took the right theory of this 
proceeding at the outset, and that the findings, conclusions, 
and judgment are amply supported by the evidence. 
To justify our position that we rightfully terminated 
plaintiff's lease and took possession of the premises we 
shall attempt to respond seriatim to the points presented 
by plaintiff in support of his assertion that defendants 
wrongfully and unlawfully dispossessed plaintiff and term~ 
inated his lease. 
( 1) THAT DURING THE YEAR 1952, DE .. 
PENDANTS DID NOT FURNISH SUFFICIENT 
WATER TO PLAINTIFF FOR OPERATION OF THE 
SOFT ICE CREAM MACHINES. 
a. Operation of soft ice cream machines was not 
specifically specified in the lease agreement. 
b. Assuming the parties dehors the lease provisions 
had in contemplation operation of soft ice cream machines, 
plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact that the only water 
supply for the entire area was insufficient to operate even 
one unit of such a machine at full capacity constantly, 
and that if defendants' by their efforts to supply additional 
water from a well failed they had done all that was 
physically possible to perform their covenant to supply 
adequate water. Plaintiff was not misled by this provision 
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of the lease and when the water supply from the well 
failed he installed an air cooler. This substitute he must 
have had in mind when he undertook the soft ice cream 
business, after his experience at the cafe. 
c. Alleged damage from this source was too specu ... 
lative and no substantial evidence was presented upon 
which a judgment could lie. 
(2) THAT DURING THE YEAR 1951 AND UN ... 
TIL JUNE 16, 1952, DEFENDANTS WERE INDEBTED 
TO PLAINTIFF IN THE SUM OF $1,942.50. 
a. This statement is correct, but the indebtedness was 
founded upon an independent transaction between the 
parties; the indebtedness was secured by a chattel mort ... 
gage and in no sense could have been a proper off ... set to 
plaintiff's obligation for rent under the lease. 
(3) THAT FROM JUNE 16th UNTIL APRIL 23, 
1952, DEFENDANTS WERE INDEBTED TO PLAIN ... 
TIFF IN THE SUM OF $346.00 ON OPEN ACCOUNT. 
a. There is absolutely no evidence to support this 
statement. Plaintiff at all times after the execution of the 
note and mortgage of March 1st, 1952, for $2146.00 
took the position that this $346.00 was secured by the 
mortgage (Record 133). 
b. The indebtedness was not due and payable until 
March 1st, 1954, hence could not be used as an off ... set to 
plaintiff's obligation to the defendants for rent. 
( 4) THAT DEFENDANTS TOOK OVER FORC ... 
IBL Y FROM PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEES POSSESSION 
OF THE FROSTY FREEZE PLACE OF BUSINESS ON 
THE 23rd DAY OF AUGUST, 1952. 
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a. No force was applied in taking possession of the 
premises. Defendant Firm simply told plaintiff's employee, 
Mrs. Hirschi, he would have to padlock the door, which 
he proceeded to do. 
b. Written notice of their intention to terminate the 
lease and take possession of the premises had previously 
been personally served on plaintiff, under date of July 
26th, 1952, alleging or stating the cause to be the failure 
of the plaintiff to make accountings and pay rent as pro ... 
vided in the lease. Plaintiff's offer of August 19th, 1952, 
was not a compliance with his agreement and was properly 
refused by defendant Firm. 
(5) THAT THEREAFTER, DEFENDANTS HAVE 
BEEN IN SOLE, EXCLUSIVE AND CONTINUOUS 
POSSESSION OF THE FROSTY FREEZE PREMISES 
AND ALL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES THEREIN. 
a. This statement is correct. Possession has been 
rightful at all times indicated. 
( 6) THAT ON OCTOBER 6, 1952, DEFEN ... 
DANTS REFUSED PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO RE ... 
ENTER AND REMOVE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
FROM THE FROSTY FREEZE PREMISES. 
a. No demand or request was made by plaintiff on 
Oct. 6, 1952, to remove any property from the Frosty 
Freeze premises. Plaintiff asked permission to enter to 
look at some supplies and papers. This was refused by 
defendant Firm, unless it was all right with Mr. Cox. 
It is not clear from the record whether Firm referred to 
his partner Paul Cox or his then attorney LeRoy H. 
Cox. 
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b. Plaintiff made no offer to pay the rental obliga ... 
tion at that time. 
(7) THAT THE FROSTY FREEZE BUILDING 
HAS NEVER BEEN COMPLETED AS CONTEM .. 
PLATED BY THE PARTIES. 
a. No substantial evidence was ever presented as to 
just what a completed building for Frosty Freeze business 
meant in the contemplation of the parties. 
b. The plaintiff waived any deficiency in this respect 
for the first season of 1951 when he got his rental reduced 
to 5 ?~ of net take. 
c. For the year 1952, additional work was done on 
the building and plaintiff himself admitted little, if any, 
damage resulted from anything yet to be done to complete 
the building (Record 121 ) . 
(8) THAT THE FAILURE TO FURNISH SUFFI .. 
CIENT WATER FOR THE OPERATION OF THE 
FROSTY FREEZE BUSINESS AND THE FAILURE TO 
COMPLETE THE FROSTY FREEZE BUILDING HAVE 
CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
a. These contentions we feel are amply answered by 
answers to Nos. 1 and 7 above. 
(9) THAT THE WIFE OF DEFENDANT FIRM, 
REFUSED TO SIGN THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
AND PROMISSORY NOTE AND THAT NONE OF 
THE PARTIES CONSIDERED THE CHATTEL MORT .. 
GAGE AND NOTE FOR $2146.00 AS A VALID IN .. 
STRUMENT. 
a. The note and chattel mortgage for $2146.00 was a 
renewal of a previous obligation duly executed by all 
parties who signed the original note and mortgage for 
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12 
$1800.00. This was an obligation incurred by Firm prior 
to his marriage to the present Mrs. Firm who refused to 
sign the new note and mortgage. It was in no sense an 
obligation of Mrs. Firm. The plaintiff and his counsel both 
deemed her signature unnecessary, but added provision 
for it with the thought it would do not harm and might 
do some good (Rec. 128). 
b. The testimony of defendant Paul J. Cox regarding 
the validity of the note and mortgage of March I, 1952, 
for $2146.00 was not directed to the matter of Mrs. Firm 
failing to sign the instruments, but to the fact that he 
later learned there was some controversy over the liability 
of the defendants for certain items installed at the Frosty 
Freeze building and which were included in the items of 
cost making up the bill for 346.00 which was added to 
the original obligation of $1800.00. 
c. Plaintiff retained possession of the note and mort ... 
gage in question and testified at the trial that he still re ... 
garded the instruments as security for payment of the 
$346.00 (Rec. 133). 
It is therefore clear from the evidence that there was 
no failure on the part of the defendants or either of them 
to comply with the terms of their agreement with plaintiff 
which justified plaintiff in failing to make monthly, ac ... 
curate accounting of his conduct of the business and pay 
the rentals specifically agreed upon in the lease agree ... 
ment. 
If the defendants had regarded the lease agreement 
as tied into the previous indebtedness payable by them to 
plaintiff they might well have made claim to an off ... set for 
the rental due them. Instead, they fully paid the principal 
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and interest of their obligation and permitted plaintiff 
to retain possession of the new note and mortgage which 
included the $346.00 ·additional. The court found this a 
valid subsisting obligation from the defendants to plaintiff, 
but not due and payable until March 1, 1954, hence 
not a set ... off against plaintiff's rent obligation to de ... 
fendants. 
Plaintiff cites the following cases in support of his 
contention that since Mrs. Howard Firm refused to sign 
the note and mortgage of March 1, 1952, for the prin ... 
cipal sum of $2146.00 none of the other parties who 
had already signed were bound by their signatures and 
the instruments were therefore null and void: 
Ely vs. Phillips, 89 W. Va. 580, 109 S. E. 808. 
Stockyards Nat'l Bank of South Omaha v. 
Bragg 67 Ut. 60, 245 Pac. 966, and Martineau vs. 
Hanson, 47 Ut. 549, 155 Pac. 432, and other cases 
cited in the Stockyards case. 
Anthony Macaroni Co. vs. Nunziato, 5 Cal. 
App. 2nd 588, 43 Pac. 2nd 315. 
We have carefully examined all of these cases but 
find none of them applicable to the facts in the instant 
case. We find no quarrel with the principle laid down 
in these authorities, but in each case the facts squarely 
support the principle. In the case at bar the obligation 
was but a renewal of an old obligation and was uJlhesi ... 
tatingly executed by all the original signers, none of whom 
even tacitly indicated they would not be bound by their 
signatures unless Mrs. Firm would also sign. The fact 
that the holder did not record the mortgage does not make 
the obligation invalid. As between the parties then1selves 
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the instrument is valid and subsisting and the Court so 
found. 
In the Anthony Macaroni Co. vs. Nunxiato case cited 
by plaintiff a lease agreement was involved in which two 
partners, Raulli and Bizzari, were to execute said lease as 
Lessors and Nunziato as Lessee. Raulli signed, but Bizzari 
refused. Nunziato agreed to take this lease in lieu of the 
assignment of prior lease on the same premises, provided 
both Raulli and Bizzari signed the second lease. Upon his 
refusal to sign the court held the lease invalid. This case 
is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In passing on the Macaroni case the court cited with 
approval Cavanaugh vs. Cassellman, 83 Cal. 543, 26 Pac. 
515, where the court held: 
It is not the rule that a contract which upon 
its ·face purports tobe inter partes must invariably 
be executed by all whose names appear in the 
instrument before it should be binding upon any. 
One reason why it is held in so many cases that 
an agreement is not to be operative upon one until 
it has been signed by another, is that such sign ... 
ing is the consideration upon which such other 
first signer is to be bound, but when a sufficient 
consideration for the agreement on the part of the 
first signer is shown to authorize its enforcement, 
he cannot be released therefrom unless he can show 
there were other considerations for his signing the 
instrument than those named in the instrument. 
In Bishop Contracts, 348, it is said: 
"If by parol stipulation, or a fortiori, if by the 
writing itself, the contract was not to be deemed 
complete until other signatures should be added, 
it without such addition will not bind those who 
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have signed it, but if nothing of this appears, the 
parties signing will be holden, even though on the 
face of it the signatures of others were contemplated 
by the draftsman. The same rule is stated in Kurtz 
vs. Forquer, 94 Cal. 91, 29 Pac. 413. 
And again: In C.J.S. Vol. 59, Page 165, Sec. 
119, It is said: "A mortgage intended to be exe..-
cuted by joint mortgagors is not binding on any 
who fail to sign and acknowledge it, but it may, 
if the circumstances permit be held valid against 
those who do execute it. Citing C.J. Vol. 41, Page 
419, Sec. 273, supporting text with the following 
authorities: 
Taylor vs. Riddle, (Tenn. Ch.) 57 SW 158. 
East Texas Fire Ins. Co. vs. Clarke 79 Tex. 23, 
15 sw 166. 
Davis vs. Hall (Ark.) 179 SW 323. 
11 L.R.A. 293. 
See also: 
Peacock vs. Horne, 126 S.E. 813, 159 Ga. 707. 
Rubendall vs. Tarbox, 208 Ill. App. 3 7 6. 
Utilities Ins. Co. vs. Stuart, a Nebraska case, 
278 N.W. 827. 
Winter vs. Kitto, 100 Cal. App. 302, 279 
Pac. 1024. 
We submit the great weight of authority will support 
the court's finding that Howard Firm, Paul J. Cox, and 
Mrs. Paul J. Cox are bound by the Note and mortgage 
executed by them on March 1st, 1952, although Mrs. 
Howard Firm failed to join in said instruments. Their 
indebtedness not yet due and payable under that obliga ... 
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tion can not be used as an off ... set by plaintiff under his 
rental obligation to the defendants. 
Plaintiff having failed to predicate his case on the 
forcible entry and detainer statute, we are unable to see 
how the case of Paxton vs. Fisher, 86 Utah, 408, 45 P. 
2nd 903, applies. 
The alleged eviction of plaintiff by defendants must 
be proved on grounds wholly distinct from the principles 
laid down in the Paxton case. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Hargrave vs. Leigh, 73 Utah, 
178, 283 Pac. 298, in support of his alleged eviction by 
defendants. . After carefully examining and considering 
that case, we believe that case is clearly distinguishable 
from the case at bar. In that case the tenant was a month 
to month. ten~t. She owed some rent, but no notice to 
quit was served upon her as provided by the statute, for 
that cause or any other. 
Plaintiff also cites Richardson vs. Pridmore, 97 Cal. 
App; 2nd, 124, 217 Pac. 2nd 113, 17 A.L.R. 2nd, 1929. 
That case is also clearly distinguishable from the case at 
bar. In that case the tenant's rent was fully paid for the 
period involved. During his absence the landlord removed 
all the tenant's belongings to the basement, changed the 
lock on. the door, and refused to admit tenant to the apart..-
ment upon his return. Tenant's wife was in an early stage 
of pregnancy and by reason of the landlord refusing to 
let her use the freight elevator to take her belongings 
out of the building, together with other abus}ve conduct, 
a miscarriage resulted. The court rightfully held the ten..-
ant was wrongfully evicted and that her miscarriage was 
the direct or proximate result of the mistreatment she 
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received on the occasion of her eviction. We fail to see 
how plaintiff can take any comfort from this authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Even if this court should determine the $346.00 due 
and owing by defendants to plaintiff on open account 
rather than in the chattel mortgage, we contend lessee may 
not rely on a set off or counterclaim to excuse his failure to 
pay the rent so as to prevent a forfeiture, except in a case 
where the lessor has expressly or impliedly agreed thereto: 
Taylor vs. Brice, 34 N. E. 833, 7 Ind. App. 551; Morrill 
vs. De Ia Granja, 99 Mass. 383; Johnson vs. Douglas, 7 3 
Mo. 168. 
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, when the 
lease contains a provision the lessor may proceed to end the 
lease on the breach of a covenant to pay rent: American 
Surety Co. of New York vs. U. S. C.C.A., 112 Fed. 2nd 
903; Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. vs. 
Moore, 64 Pac. 2d 460, 18 Cal. App. 2d 522; Kulawitz 
vs. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 155 Pac. 2d 24, 25 
Cal. 2d 664; Weill vs. Centralia Service & Oil Co., 51 N. E. 
2d 345, 320 Ill. App. 397. 
The defendants rightfully terminated plaintiff's lease 
and took possession of the leased premises for his failure 
to pay the rentals provided in the agreement. 
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment in this case are 
amply supported by the evidence and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Counsel /or Respondents. 
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